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How moral disagreement may ground principled moral 
compromise  
By Klemens Kappel, University of Copenhagen, July 2017 
Forthcoming in Politics, Philosophy and Economics 
1. Introduction 
There is pervasive disagreement about morally laden policy issues such as 
genetically modified crops, abortion, gun control, taxation, assisted death, same 
sex marriage, the death penalty, the minimum wage, public health and medical 
care. In these and similar cases, moral disagreements frequently underlie 
                                             
  Earlier and somewhat different versions of some of the ideas 
discussed were presented at Early versions of some of the ideas discussed in this 
paper were presented at workshops and conferences held at the University of 
Copenhagen in August 2014 and May 2015. Thanks to Simon C. May, Daniel 
Weinstock, Fabian Wendt, Xavier Landes, Karin Joench-Clausen, Christian 
Rostbøll and others present at these occasions for stimulating discussion. 
Thanks in particular to Martin Marchman for many discussions of these issues. 
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divergent views as to what policies should be adopted. These moral 
disagreements are often recalcitrant - parties to the disagreement fail to be 
moved by their counterpart’s arguments and views, or at least fail to reach a 
consensus. It is a commonly held view that when we face policy disagreements 
rooted in persistent moral disagreement, we should at least sometimes come to 
a compromise. 1 
 In an influential paper, Simon C. May has forcefully argued that, 
properly understood, there can never be what is termed principled reasons for 
moral compromise (May 2005).2 Unquestionably, there may be pragmatic 
reasons for compromising that involve, for instance, concern for political 
expediency or for stability. But properly understood, principled reasons to 
compromise are illusory - they don't exist.  
                                             
1
   See e.g. (Dobel 1990; Carens 1979; Bird 1996; Macedo 1990; Wong 
1992; Bellamy & Hollis 1999). 
2  Note that May believes that this claim does not apply to private life, 
see (May 2011). 
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 My aim in this paper is to show how principled moral compromise 
in the context of moral disagreements over policy options is possible. While 
May argues that disagreement can never ground a principled reason to depart 
from the all things considered best position in favor of a compromise, I argue 
that when we disagree, principled reasons favoring compromises or 
compromising can assume a more significant part of what makes a position all 
things considered best. 
 The paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 seeks to characterize 
the notion of a moral compromise. In Section 3 I distinguish between different 
types of reasons for compromise. In section 4 I review May's argument against 
the possibility of there being principled reasons for moral compromise. Sections 
5 through 7 develop an account of how disagreement about moral questions 
paves the way for moral compromise. In Section 8 I consider some objections to 
the account developed, and in Section 9 I make a few concluding remarks. 
2. Moral Compromises 
I begin by clarifying what is to be understood by a moral compromise. To do so, 
it is convenient to work with an example, albeit a very schematic one:  
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Adele and Betty disagree about some moral issue, and as a result, they disagree 
about which policy to adopt in the relevant domain. Having discussed their 
respective convictions and exchanged arguments extensively, they are entirely 
familiar with one another's position. Both Adele and Betty have formed stable 
views that are not about to change. All possibilities of adding new policy 
options to the table, or of devising policy options that meet more of each 
party’s desiderata, have been explored to no avail.3 On the one hand, Adele 
espouses the moral view P, and based on this, prefers policy X. Betty, on the 
other, is committed to the moral view Q, which results in her belief that policy Z 
is best. Y is a position that is located between X and Z on the spectrum of policy 
possibilities.  
 
                                             
3  See Weinstock on the possibility of what he calls integrative and 
substitutive compromises (Weinstock 2013). Here and throughout, I consider 
reasons for compromise relative to a fixed set of options. So if integrative or 
substitutive compromises are available, they have already been included within 
the list of policy options. 
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This is the paradigmatic type of case that I will have in mind throughout the 
discussion. The case illustrates a schema that provides a plausible constraint on 
what counts as compromise: for some policy option Y to count as a 
compromise, it must be located between salient extremes X and Z, each 
respectively preferred by the compromising parties.4  
 A couple of things should be noted. First, X, Y and Z are policy 
options and not moral views. So, I assume that what compromises concerns 
policy options, not moral views. I also assume that in the cases we are 
concerned with, support for policy options are motivated at least in part by 
moral concerns. This is why it is appropriate to talk about moral compromise, 
even though, as just noted, we compromise about policy options and not basic 
moral commitments. It is not clear what sense it makes, if any, to compromise 
on one's basic moral commitments, but we can set this question aside. 
 Second, in most of the discussion, I assume that X and Z are policy 
options placed at the far ends of a spectrum, and that Y is a position located 
somewhere between X and Z. In many realistic cases there will be indefinitely 
                                             
4  Cf. (May 2013) 
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many positions that qualify as compromise positions in this schematic sense. 
Consider, for example, a disagreement over progressive taxation. Some argue 
that there should be a steep progressive taxation, say 80% for very high 
incomes, and the basis for holding such a position may be morally motivated 
(after all, those who earn a lot do so in great part because of luck). Others are in 
favor of a regressive taxation, such that high earners effectively pay a lesser 
fraction of their income in tax (say, because of moral views about self-ownership 
and entitlement to whatever your skills and circumstances can earn you). 
Obviously, there are indefinitely many positions in between these two extremes, 
including positions that are arbitrarily close to either extreme.5 
                                             
5  A full account of moral compromises would need the notion of a 
fair compromise, where this is not simply any position between extreme 
positions, even if the extreme positions are somehow both reasonable. 
Evidently, when we seek compromises, what we typically want are compromises 
that are fair. Establishing a metric for the fairness of compromises is a difficult 
challenge. For an interesting discussion of the notion of a fair compromise, see 
(Jones & O’Flynn 2012) 
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3. Reasons and compromises 
Consider now what it is to have a reason to compromise.  First, recall the 
familiar distinction between instrumental (or pragmatic) reasons and non-
instrumental (or principled) reasons. We often have instrumental reason to 
accept a compromise, say in the interest of ongoing collaboration, or because 
we wish to preserve stability. Indeed, in many cases, such instrumental concerns 
provide strong or even overriding reasons for accepting a compromise. 
However, like May and others, I set aside instrumental reasons for compromise, 
and focus strictly on non-instrumental reasons, or what are often referred to as 
principled or moral reasons for compromise. Henceforth, when I speak about 
reasons for compromises and compromises, I mean principled or moral reasons 
for compromises and principled or moral compromises. To elaborate further, 
consider this expansion of the case provided above:  
 
Adele has in fact (and, what she justifiably takes to be) the all things considered 
best view on the moral issue in question, and a fully legitimate procedure of 
reasoning has given Adele her favored policy X. Betty fully acknowledges the 
legitimacy of that procedure, and accepts to abide by X even though she still 
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thinks that Z would be a superior policy. So, policy X will prevail unless Adele 
decides to concede Y so as to reach a compromise with Betty.  
 
As the case is set up, Adele is by no means under pressure to accept a 
compromise, and there are no instrumental reasons in favor of her doing so. 
Assume that this means that if Adele has any reason to consent to a 
compromise at all, that reason will be a moral reason or a principled reason, and 
we thereby get some grasp of these notions (cf. May 2005: 319ff).6 
 We now need to distinguish between several types of principled 
reasons for accepting a compromise. Consider first what pro tanto reasons to 
compromise. By this I mean a factor or consideration that count in favor of 
compromise. Of course, pro tanto reasons for compromise can exist along with 
with pro tanto reasons against. Sometimes the balance of pro tanto reasons for 
                                             
6  It is not clear how one exactly separate instrumental or pragmatic 
reasons from moral reasons in all cases. However, it does not affect my 
argument if it turns out that the class of moral reasons for compromise include 
part of what might in the first instance consider pragmatic reasons. 
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and against may favor a particular option, and we can then say that this option 
is all things considered best. We might say that when an option is favored by 
the balance of the pro tanto reasons, then there is an all things considered 
reason for this option, though this all things considered reason is, of course, not 
a separate reason but just a composite of the underlying pro tanto reasons. If 
there is an all things considered reason for accepting some policy option, this 
just means that this option emerges as best once all relevant factors are taken 
into account. That is, the balance of reasons favors that option over all other 
options. Note that even if some option is all things considered best, there may 
still be some features counting in favor of other options. When this is so, we can 
say that while the balance of pro tanto reasons favor one particular option - the 
all things considered best option - there are one or more pro tanto reasons 
favoring other options.  
 Suppose that Adele has correctly identified X as the policy that is all 
things considered best. Could there then be all things considered reasons that 
favor another option Y? Could Adele coherently believe that there are all things 
considered reasons for adopting the compromise position Y? Clearly, these 
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questions must be answered in the negative. If X is all things considered best, 
some different option Y cannot be all things considered best as well.7 When 
Adele believes that X is all things considered best, she cannot coherently think 
there is an all things considered reason to favor some compromise policy 
position Y. 
 This is not so in the case of pro tanto reasons for compromise. Even 
if X is the all things considered best policy, there may still be pro tanto reasons 
counting in favor of some compromise option Y. It is just that the pro tanto 
reasons favoring Y are outweighed by other pro tanto reasons favoring X 
(otherwise X would not be all things considered best). So, when Adele correctly 
identifies X as the all things considered best option, she could surely still 
                                             
7  If 'all things considered best' is interpreted as meaning equally 
good or better than any alternative, then two options could both be all things 
considered best. We can set this possibility aside. When I refer to an option as 
all things considered best, I mean that it is strictly better than any other 
alternative in the relevant set. 
How moral disagreement may ground principled moral compromise 
11 
 
recognize pro tanto reasons that support Y, though she would have to commit 
to holding that the balance of reasons favor X. 
 We now need to distinguish between various types of pro tanto 
reasons that may be involved in compromises. Suppose again that X is all things 
considered best, and that Y is a compromise policy. Now, there might be 
features of Y that make Y morally attractive independently of Y being a 
compromise position. Assume, for instance, that Y involves a more equitable 
distribution of goods than X does, and assume that this is a good-making 
feature of X. In this case, there is a pro tanto reason in favor of policy option Y 
that does not depend on Y being a compromise position. This good-making 
feature of Y is not contingent on Y being located between the salient policy 
extremes X and Z at issue in the dispute in question. So, there may be pro tanto 
reasons for a policy option Y that essentially depend on intrinsic features of Y, 
and not on Y constituting a compromise relative to other positions.  
 Other pro tanto reasons for compromise may depend on a position 
Y being situated as a compromise relative to X and Z. Suppose that X is a policy 
that favors one half of the population, and Z a policy that favors the other half, 
while Y is a compromise policy in that it distributes goods evenly between both 
halves of the population. Y would then have the feature that it splits evenly 
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between two salient extreme positions. This feature of Y could support a pro 
tanto reason in favor of Y, where this pro tanto reason would essentially depend 
on Y being a compromise position between two salient extremes. Henceforth, I 
refer to this type of reason as a pro tanto reason for a compromise. So, a pro 
tanto reason for a compromise is a reason in favor of a particular policy option 
Y, where this reason essentially depends on Y being located in between certain 
contextually salient extremes. 
 A third type of pro tanto reason does not depend on any particular 
property of compromise positions, but rather on the process of compromising, 
i.e. on features of negotiating or altering one's ranking of various policy options 
in response to disagreement. I will refer to these as pro tanto reasons for 
compromising, and they should be distinguished from pro tanto reasons for a 
particular compromise. Pro tanto reasons for compromising are moral reasons 
that reside in concerns such as that for inclusion, respect, reciprocity, or civic 
friendship. Concern for procedural fairness or legitimacy may also ground 
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reasons for compromising.8 If cogent, these are moral reasons for allowing a 
process of compromising to be part of a decision-making procedure that selects 
a policy option.  
 Reasons for compromising are independent of any particular 
features of the compromise positions salient in a context of disagreement; they 
are reasons for finding an intermediary position between initial positions held 
by participants in a decision-making context, and are not reasons for finding 
any particular feature of salient compromise options attractive. Note also that 
even if agents have compelling reasons for compromising, these reasons may 
be entirely unsuited to identifying any one particular compromise position as 
the most appropriate. And there might be many cases in which there are no 
sufficiently weighty pro tanto reasons for compromising that single out any 
particular compromise positions in the spectrum. This adds to the difficulty of 
determining what constitutes a fair compromise, but fortunately we need not 
worry about this here. 
                                             
8  See (Wendt 2016; May 2005; May 2013) for discussions of these 
moral reasons for compromising. 
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 In summary, we need to differentiate between instrumental (or 
pragmatic) reasons for compromise and principled (or moral) reasons for 
compromise.  Moreover, we should distinguish between reasons for 
compromises, and reasons for compromising. Finally, we also need to 
distinguish between a pro tanto reason for a compromise (or for compromising) 
and a compromise being the all things considered best option. 
 With these distinctions in mind, return now to the overall question 
at hand: when we disagree with one another about what to do, do we ever have 
principled reasons for compromise? As should be clear by now, this question is 
too blunt. First, as we have seen, if some option X is best because the balance of 
pro tanto reasons favors that option, then there cannot be an all things 
considered reason to favor some compromise Y. This is incoherent, as it 
amounts to X being best while some alternative Y is also best. Second, if some 
option X is best because the balance of pro tanto reasons favors that option, 
then there can nevertheless be a pro tanto reason for a compromise, and there 
can be pro tanto reason for compromising. It is just that these pro tanto reasons 
will be outweighed by other pro tanto reasons in favor of X. This much should 
be uncontroversial. But a question that remains, I believe, is this: Could pro 
tanto reasons for compromising or pro tanto reasons for a compromise be part 
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of the balance of pro tanto reasons that make some option all things 
considered best? When Adele initially prefers policy option X as all things 
considered best and reflects on her disagreement with Betty, could she end up 
thinking that Y is the all things considered best option, where part of what 
makes Y all things considered best is essentially connected to the fact of her 
disagreement with Betty? Could Adele have reasons for compromises or reasons 
for compromising that are triggered by her disagreement with Betty, such that 
the balance of reasons is decisively shifted from favoring X to favoring Y? This is 
the question I will be concerned with. 
 It is quite important to distinguish this question about principled 
compromises from a distinct but related question.9 Suppose that Adele believes 
that policy X is the best policy, but this is conditional on everyone agreeing that 
X is best. So, Adele thinks that X conditional on consensus on X is better than 
any other policy conditional on agreement on that policy. Or suppose that 
                                             
9  Though I use a different terminology, I here follow the very 
illuminating account in (Wendt 2016), see especially chapter 3 on two levels of 
moral evaluation. 
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Adele evaluates X as the best policy, while somehow abstracting from facts 
about the contentiousness of X and alternatives to X (say because policies are 
evaluated by features that can be assessed independently of facts about how 
well they are received by citizens who have to live with them). Let us say that 
when either of the above is true, then Adele believes that X is the ideally best 
policy.10  
 Clearly, a policy being ideally best is different from a policy being all 
things considered best. When a policy X is all things considered best it is 
superior to other policies given that all pro tanto moral reasons are taken into 
account, including those that in some lose sense depend on disagreement 
about various policies, say concern for peace, public justification, stability, 
                                             
10  Wendt suggests that the ideally best policy is the policy that we 
would convince all others about, if we could do so at no cost (Wendt 2017, 198). 
This might correct, but I suspect that that is not informative as we do not have 
an independent grasp of what we one would convince others about at not cost. 
Why wouldn't we try to convince others about what is all things considered 
best?  
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inclusion, accommodation, respect, and mutual recognition.11 Clearly, policies 
that are ideally best need not be all things considered best, and we don't have 
to regard them as such. Suppose, for example, that Adele knows that policy X 
would be quite controversial and unpopular, or that it would even violate 
individuals' right to a qualified consent if imposed on them against their will. In 
that case, while Adele might still think that X is ideally best, she surely should 
not think that X is best all things considered.12  
 One reason this is relevant is that we might follow Fabian Wendt, 
who in a recent contribution defines principled moral compromises in terms of 
                                             
11  What makes a policy better than another policy might depend on 
degrees of compliance. If so, then even if everyone actually agrees what policy is 
ideally best, it does not follow that this policy is best all things considered. This 
can happen when compliance with the policy is low even when everyone agrees 
to the policy. If so, some other policy, that not everyone agrees about, but 
which nonetheless has a higher compliance, might be better all things 
considered. 
12  Thanks to a reviewer for suggestions leading to these clarifications. 
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the distinction between ideally best and all things considered best.13 On his 
view, we have principled reasons for compromises when we have moral reasons 
to deviate from the ideally best policy in favor of some policy that is all things 
considered best (or better that the ideal best policy). The moral reasons in 
question can concern peace or public justification (as Wendt argues), but might 
also include other matters. By contrast, we have pragmatic or instrumental 
reasons for compromises when what our reasons to depart from the ideally best 
policy are merely pragmatic or instrumental reasons. If moral compromises are 
defined in terms of morally justified deviations from ideally best policies in favor 
all things considered best options, then I suspect that there is no room for 
genuine debate whether principled compromises are possible. 
                                             
13  Wendt describes the view in terms of two levels of moral evaluation 
(Wendt 2016). To me it seems more apt to talk about two different objects of 
evaluation at stake: the ideally best evaluates policies independently of issues 
about consent and controversy, whereas all things considered best evaluates 
the actual worlds in which policies are implemented.  
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 I have no objections to using the term 'moral compromise' for 
principled deviations from the ideal best in favor of the all things considered 
best. Clearly, however, this notion of moral compromise leaves us with a further 
question. Normally, we are concerned about what is all things considered best. 
Indeed, it might seem that this should always be our ultimate concern - it is 
hard to see why we would ever care about what is ideally best, except is this is 
part of an effort to identify the all things considered best. And generally, when 
we disagree about policies, we disagree about which policies are all things 
considered best. Suppose that Adele identifies X as the all things considered 
best policy. Adele now learns that Betty does not agree that X is the all things 
considered best policy; rather she thinks that Z is the best policy, also 
purporting to take all morally relevant factors into account. Now, do Adele and 
Betty have a principled reason to compromise in this case? This question does 
not even make sense if we reserve the word 'principled compromise' to 
principled deviations from the ideally best. While the common view might be 
that Adele and Betty should have reason to compromise, as I understand May, 
he argues that, in a sense, they have not. Once the all things considered best 
option has been identified, disagreement about what is all things considered 
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best constitute no additional reason to depart from it. I return to May's 
argument in section 4. 
 The plan for the rest of the paper is the following. I argue that 
moral disagreement is sometimes a reason reduce rational confidence in one's 
moral commitments (Section 5). Second, I argue that although reduced 
confidence in one's moral commitments does not itself constitute a pro tanto 
reason for compromising, or a pro tanto reason for any particular compromise 
(Section 6), reduced confidence may nonetheless facilitate pro tanto reasons for 
compromising, or pro tanto reasons for specific compromises (Section 7). When 
this occurs in a context of disagreement, pro tanto reasons for compromising or 
for specific compromises can affect what one should consider all things 
considered best. Before turning to my positive argument for the possibility of 
principled moral compromises, it will be helpful first to review May's arguments 
for his negative claim, and I do so in the next section. 
4. May on the impossibility of moral compromise 
May considers and rejects four reasons commonly invoked in support of the 
notion that Adele and Betty have principled reasons for compromise in the sort 
of situation depicted above. One argument is epistemic in nature, while the 
others appeal to putative moral reasons for compromises. The first argument 
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appeals to complexity or fallibility: 'Principled compromise may be the best way 
to acknowledge our fallibility and the limitations of our ability to discern moral 
truth' (May 2005: 339). Second, one might appeal to respect: ’giving one’s 
reasonable opponents the respect they deserve requires a willingness to 
appreciate their point of view and adjust one’s position accordingly’ (May 2005: 
340). Third, May considers the view that one is morally obligated to 
accommodate one’s opponents view in a workable moral compromise (May 
2005: 342). Fourth, one might appeal to reciprocity: ’if a position on abortion is 
not morally acceptable to all reasonable people motivated to find mutually 
acceptable terms of cooperation, the value of reciprocity provides a principled 
reason to seek out an alternative that is.’ (May 2005: 344) 
 To appreciate the force of May's arguments, consider first the 
appeal to complexity or fallibility (May 2005: 338-340). Assume that Jane is a 
proponent of a pro-choice abortion policy and that she in fact endorses the all 
things considered best policy. Assume that the all things considered best policy 
is about to be adopted as a result of a legitimate decision-making procedure 
that has been accepted by dissenting members of the community. The question 
for May is whether Jane now would have a reason to propose a compromise 
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policy due to the complexity of and the controversy surrounding the abortion 
question.  
 May offers two reasons why Jane's recognition of the complexity of 
the dispute, and of her own fallibility, is not a valid ground for compromise in 
this context. First, if acknowledging the complexity of the issues should make 
Jane less certain about her own position, it should make her equally unsure 
about any proposed compromise position. As May notes, 'A policy that splits 
the moral difference between two opposing yet reasonable viewpoints need be 
no more self-evident than the viewpoints themselves' (May 2005: 339). So 
compromise positions need not be epistemically preferable to non-compromise 
positions. 
 Second, May points out that the complexity of the issues and the 
intractable nature of the disagreement do not constitute first order reasons for 
Jane to think that her view is wrong, or needs correction. A first-order reason is 
a moral reason for thinking that some part of a moral view is right or wrong. For 
instance, a commitment to the value of autonomy is a first-order reason to think 
that it is a mistake to hold that physician-assisted death is never morally 
permissible. But Jane's acknowledgement of her fallibility as a moral thinker is 
not a first-order reason to think that her view needs correction - as May 
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remarks, 'this doubt is normatively inert' (May 2005: 339). Jane's 
acknowledgement of her fallibility may be a higher-order reason for reducing 
confidence in her view, but not for revising the content of her view. 
 Consider now moral reasons for principled compromises, that is, 
reasons having to do with respect, accommodation, inclusion and reciprocity. 
Why is Jane's respect for her fellow citizens not a reason for her to seek 
compromise when she disagrees with them about policy options? May argues: 
 
'there are many ways to express respect without resorting to compromise. Jane 
can take the arguments of her pro-life opponents seriously and take time to 
respond to them appropriately. She can stick to criticisms of their arguments 
and eschew insulting ad hominem attacks. She can even form working 
relationships and alliances with regard to other matters. Yet none of this 
provides any principled reason for moral compromise.' (May 2005: 342) 
 
Surely, sometimes one policy is morally better than another because it treats 
citizens more respectfully, and the same is true for moral concerns such as 
accommodation, inclusion and reciprocity. May's point is not that these 
concerns are irrelevant, but that once Jane has identified the all things 
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considered best policy, where this includes due consideration for moral 
requirements such as respect, accommodation, inclusion and reciprocity, then 
further disagreement about what is all things considered best is not a reason for 
compromise. May argues that once we have identified the view we consider all 
things considered best, these epistemic and moral concerns might affect how 
we should hold a view in cases of disagreement, but they should not make us 
adjust what view we should hold. Acknowledgement of fallibility may be a 
higher-order reason for reducing one's confidence in one’s moral view, but it is 
not a first-order reason for correcting one’s view. Similarly, respect and inclusion 
might be reasons to take what one’s opponents say in earnest, but they do not 
constitute reasons to change one’s view if one has already accommodated the 
reasons and arguments one’s interlocutors offer. Hence May concludes that, 
properly understood, there are no principled reasons for moral compromise.14  
                                             
14  May does not distinguish between principled reasons for 
compromises and principled reasons for compromising, but it is clear from his 
arguments that he rejects both. 
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 I believe that May is right in this. As I noted above, if an option is all 
things considered best, there cannot be a balance of pro tanto reasons that 
favor another option. And one cannot think that some option is all things 
considered best, and still believe that there are overriding reasons to prefer 
another option. One important thing to note while we should accept this, we 
should still freely acknowledge that concerns for respect, accommodation, 
inclusion and reciprocity and related moral concerns may be part of what makes 
some policy option all things considered best. If we think of these reasons as 
sometimes constituting pro tanto reasons for compromises and pro tanto 
reasons for compromising then clearly such reasons may be part of what makes 
an option all things considered best.  
 This much should, I believe, be uncontroversial. I now want to argue 
that disagreement about all things considered best policy options may affect 
the extent to which reasons for compromise and reasons for compromising 
impact on what we should regard all things considered best policies. When we 
disagree about what is all things considered best, this may increase the relative 
import of pro tanto reasons to compromise or for specific compromises. I 
elaborate this view in the remainder of the paper. As May points out, merely 
lowering one's confidence in one's moral views as a result of disagreement is 
How moral disagreement may ground principled moral compromise 
26 
 
normatively inert. I elaborate this point in Section 6, but in Section 7 I argue that 
reduced rational confidence in one's moral views may nonetheless result in pro 
tanto reasons for compromising and pro tanto reasons for certain compromises 
assuming a greater relative role in the balance of reasons, which in turn will 
affect what is the all things considered best policy. First, we need to consider 
why moral disagreement can generate a reason to reduce confidence in one's 
moral views. 
5. Why moral disagreement can generate a reason to reduce confidence  
In this section I argue that moral disagreement should often, though not always, 
lead us to reduce confidence in our moral views. The question before us is this. 
Prior to engaging in her disagreement with Betty, Adele is confident that her 
position on the relevant moral issue is correct, and that she has identified the all 
things considered best policy option. Now she reflects on the fact that Betty, 
who appears to be equally thoughtful and sincere, and who is likewise fully 
acquainted with the relevant arguments and evidence, sharply disagrees. Should 
this affect Adele's confidence in her view?  
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 A full discussion of the epistemology of moral disagreement is not 
possible here, but I will indicate why I think that moral disagreement often 
constitutes a reason to reduce rational confidence in one's moral views below. 15 
First, consider what we might call local disagreement on the one hand, and 
comprehensive disagreement on the other. Adele and Betty have a local 
disagreement when their basic disagreement depends on a single moral 
intuition. Suppose that Adele has a particular strongly felt moral intuition, say 
that criminal offenders deserve punishment. Betty has an equally strongly felt 
moral intuition that criminals do not per se deserve punishment. Other 
disagreements between Adele and Betty are either irrelevant to the issue at 
hand, or they are direct consequences of these conflicting moral intuitions.  
 Suppose that Adele and Betty now realize that this moral intuition is 
the only relevant factor that divides their views. How should they react to the 
mutual recognition of this fact? According to a plausible view, they should both 
be less confident in the veracity of their respective moral intuitions. Consider the 
                                             
15  Compare (Christensen 2007; Christensen 2011) and later work. 
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situation as Adele sees it.16 She knows that she has a particular moral intuition, 
the origin of which she knows very little about. She also knows that Betty, who is 
in many respects in a comparable position, has an incompatible intuition. Adele 
has no particular higher order reason to believe that her intuition is correct, and 
that Betty's intuition is wrong. So, it is natural to think that the rational response 
for Adele is to reduce confidence that her intuition reflects a true moral 
proposition and Betty's a false one.17 Adele might still believe the propositional 
                                             
16  Note that the various prominent views in the epistemology of 
disagreement agree that disagreement should often lead us to reduce 
confidence in the disputed beliefs. What these views disagree about are the 
exact details of this story, and about the ostensible existence of cases of peer 
disagreement in which one should not reduce confidence at all. Proponents of 
non-conciliationism or the steadfast view insist that there are such cases, where 
conciliationists deny their existence. Still, both sides agree that in many cases, 
the fact of disagreement is itself a reason to reduce confidence in the disputed 
belief. 
17  See (Wedgwood 2010) for an argument to the contrary. 
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content of her intuition, but now with lesser confidence. Betty's situation is, of 
course, similar. 
 Most actual moral disagreements are not local in this sense – 
rather, they involve larger complexes of considered intuitions, reflections about 
ethical principles of various levels of generality, counter-examples, debunking 
explanations of certain moral intuitions, reflections of theoretical virtues such as 
consistency, explanatory power and simplicity of their views, and so on. 
Comprehensive disagreements engage all the familiar features involved in 
reflective equilibrium.18 Obviously, there is a spectrum of cases of moral 
disagreements, ranging from extremely local to highly comprehensive, the most 
complicated of which are entertained perhaps only by professional 
philosophers.  
 Suppose now that Adele has a fully articulated comprehensive 
moral disagreement with Betty. This is to say that Adele has a clear grasp on 
which basic moral intuitions, normative assumptions and arguments her 
position depends upon. She is also fully aware of the full dialectic of possible 
                                             
18  See e.g. (Brink 1989; Knight 2006; Daniels 1979). 
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counter-examples or counter-arguments to these normative assumptions, and 
of the counter-arguments to these counter-arguments. So, for any putative first 
order moral reason against her view that Adele is aware of, she also knows how 
to deflect or rebut that reason. Adele thus has a philosophically impeccable 
moral view.  Imagine that Betty is in the same position as regards her 
disagreement with Adele, and that they are both aware of the symmetry. 
 Now, what should Adele do? As I have set up the case, Adele is not 
confronted with undefeated first order reasons to think that the moral position 
she espouses is wrong or in need of adjustment. Adele is, to be sure, aware of 
many putative first order reasons that suggest revision, but she knows how to 
respond to these. But Adele also knows that she disagrees with Betty, so she 
appreciates that at least one of them has gotten it wrong. She knows that Betty 
is as thoughtful and reflective as herself, and that Betty can defend her position 
just as well as Adele herself can. Still, Adele can infer that a least one of them 
must have weighed the balance of arguments in the wrong way. One or the 
other (or both) has placed too high a premium on simplicity over conservation 
of intuitions, or has perhaps fed the wrong set of moral intuitions into the 
equation, or has made some other mistake. However, Adele is not in a position 
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to say with any certainty that she got it right and that Betty got it wrong. She 
should therefore reduce confidence in her view. 
 Relying on various versions of the method of reflective equilibrium, 
moral philosophers develop highly sophisticated views in ethical theory and 
political philosophy. Theoretical views in moral and political philosophy are 
defended by arguing that they are sufficiently simple, explanatorily powerful, 
and general, and that they receive adequate support from our considered moral 
intuitions. In part, this is a matter of showing that a stance in ethical theory or 
political philosophy can be defended against objections, typically arising from 
putative counter-intuitive implications or alleged incoherencies. Despite the 
great intellectual sophistication at play in these complex disagreements 
between moral philosophers, it seems that neither side to a dispute should be 
overly confident that they are correct in their views, even when these 
disagreements are fully articulated at the first-order level. This is not because we 
don't comprehend the dialectic involved, but because we lack a firm grip on 
how it all adds up. We do not well enough understand how we employ the 
method of reflective equilibrium (or any other method used to generate 
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theoretical positions in moral philosophy) to be highly confident in the results, 
particularly when we know that our peers disagree with us. 19 
 This is not to say that we should invariably conciliate in response to 
moral disagreement. Sometimes we have good reason to think that the source 
from whence our opponent derives his or her moral convictions is unlikely to be 
reflective of a sound moral view, for example, if these are derived from a source, 
the authority of which we have sound reason to question. I also do not assume 
that rational requirements to reduce confidence are always symmetrical; they 
may well not be. If your view is highly justified and mine is not, then it might be 
that I should reduce my credence more than you should.20 Of course, there are 
also cases in which disagreement and reflection on disagreement should force 
us to give up some part of our moral view entirely. I set these cases aside as 
they are not what ground compromises in the sense that we are interested in 
here. Finally, note that I do not assume that it is always transparent to us that 
                                             
19  For similar views on disagreement in philosophy, see (Frances 
2013). 
20  As argued by e.g. (Kelly 2010). 
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we should reduce confidence in our views. Indeed, in most ordinary moral 
disagreements, people may well be under an epistemic obligation to reduce 
confidence in some of their moral commitments without realizing that this is so.  
 Sometimes professional moral philosophers realize that they 
disagree over substantive moral views with their peers, yet feel entitled to a very 
high degree of confidence that they are right. But even if we concede (as I 
argued we should not) that moral philosophers are indeed entitled to a high 
degree of rational credence in their moral views despite knowing that these 
views are contested by equally sophisticated colleagues, the vast majority of the 
moral views that fuel political disagreement are not of that nature. Most people 
are not trained philosophers, and hold most of their moral views in rather 
unreflective ways. Most hold the moral outlook that they do because they are 
raised in a culture promulgating these views, and not as a result of 
conscientious reflection. Learning that others disagree with such views is surely 
an indication that one should be less confident in disputed commitments, even 
if one may often not realize this.  
6. Why mere reduced confidence does not make compromises more attractive 
Assume now that disagreement sometimes constitutes a reason to reduce 
confidence in one's moral beliefs. The next question to be addressed is whether 
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this grounds pro tanto reasons for compromising, or for specific compromises? I 
elaborate on why this is not immediately so in this section, using arguments the 
details of which differ from May's, though he would probably concur to what I 
argue. However, if we grant one further assumption, there is likely to be a fairly 
large class of cases in which moral disagreements do facilitate pro tanto reasons 
for compromise and for compromising. I return to this in Section 7. 
 Suppose that prior to engaging in their disagreement, Adele is very 
confident in her moral view P, and Betty is equally confident in her view Q. As a 
result, they are both very confident in their preferred policies, X and Z. Now as a 
consequence of engaging in the disagreement, assume that Adele and Betty 
both rationally adjust their respective degrees of confidence in P and Q such 
that they become somewhat less assured in the moral commitments that 
separate them. As a result, they both become less rationally confident in their 
preferred policies X and Z. Should the mere fact that their credences in their 
moral commitments P and Q have been lowered incline Adele and Betty 
towards compromising, or towards some compromise policy Y?  
 Suppose that after reflecting on the fact that they persistently 
disagree about P and Q, Adele and Betty still rationally believe that their 
respective views are likely to be correct, although they are less confident than 
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before. Assume, for instance, that they now each assign credence 0.6 to their 
respective moral views P and Q, whereas prior to engaging in the disagreement 
they had assigned these views credence 0.9. Do Adele and Betty have a pro 
tanto reason for adopting any particular compromise position? Suppose that Y 
is located somewhere on a scale between X and Z. It is difficult to see why the 
mere fact that Adele and Betty have reduced their initial confidence should 
make them view any compromise position Y as attractive. After all, although 
they now have reduced confidence in their respective positions, they 
presumably have still less confidence in any position that deviates from their 
initial position.  
 What, then, about pro tanto reasons for compromising? Again, it is 
difficult to see why Adele's lowered confidence, in its own right, should 
constitute a pro tanto reason for compromising with Betty. Why would the 
change in credence that results from engaging in the disagreement provide a 
reason for compromising?  
 Consider a different scenario. After deliberating and taking into 
account the fact that they disagree, Adele and Betty both assign 0.5 credence to 
the contested moral commitments. Do they now have a reason to accept a 
compromise? Even this need not be so. Suppose that while each has confidence 
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in her own view to the degree of 0.5, both still think it overwhelmingly likely that 
her opponent's view is false. Adele might be moved by her disagreement with 
Betty, and reduce confidence in her own view to the lowest possible level short 
of being more inclined than not to reject that view. Yet, Adele might still believe 
that Betty's view is very likely to be wrong. Why should this by itself move Adele 
to a position located in between her own and Betty's view?  
 How, it might be asked, can Adele become less convinced that her 
own view is correct without becoming more inclined to think that Betty is right? 
First, recall the assumption noted above, that P and Q are contrary propositions, 
not contradictory positions. Second, what may compel Adele to rationally 
reduce confidence in her view may be her observation that Betty does not seem 
to recognize the force of that view. This may cause Adele to question whether 
she has somehow made a mistake, even if she remains convinced that Betty's 
view is quite implausible. This is why Adele might rationally reduce confidence 
in her own view, but still think it overwhelmingly likely that Betty's view is 
incorrect.  
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 Finally, consider the radical scenario in which Adele and Betty both 
reduce their credence to 0.5, while each assigns that same level of credence to 
the views of their opponent.21 So, assume that Adele and Betty assign credence 
0.5 to both P and Q, and accordingly, they no longer disagree about their moral 
commitments. Since, by assumption, Adele and Betty now share their moral 
commitments, and assuming that their policy preferences are determined by 
their moral commitments, Adele and Betty should now agree about what policy 
to adopt.  
 Do they have a reason to compromise in this scenario? Surely, one 
may question whether it is still appropriate to talk about compromise in this 
type of case. After all, Adele and Betty now agree on their moral outlook, and 
also agree as to what they consider the best policy. There is no residual 
disagreement between them calling for a compromise. So, it might be most 
natural to think of this third case as one of a convergence of views, rather than 
                                             
21  Adele and Betty cannot coherently assign credences higher than 0.5 
to each other's views in this symmetrical way, since we have assumed their views 
to be contraries. 
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as one of compromise. It is still significant, however, that Adele and Betty 
converge on a view that is different from their initial views, and which they 
would not have arrived at were it not for their disagreement. This thus remains a 
case in which disagreement decisively influences what they should rationally 
consider all things considered best, though it may well be stretching the term 
too far to call it a compromise.  
7. The Reduced Weight Principle  
If what I have argued in the previous section is correct, merely reducing 
confidence in one's moral commitments does not itself generate pro tanto 
reasons for compromising, or for particular compromise positions. Yet, when we 
reduce rational confidence in our moral views as a response to disagreement, 
this can, in a different way, ground moral compromises – or so I will argue in 
this section. 
 To discuss these issues, it will now be useful to supplement the 
schematic case of moral disagreement about policy options with some 
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additional structure. Suppose that Adele and Betty disagree about abortion.22 
Adele holds the moral view P, according to which the early fetus has no 
independent moral standing, say because it has neither sentience nor 
preferences regarding it's future or present, and is not numerically identical to 
any later individual. So, other moral concerns, such as those for autonomy, 
health and social consequences, will outweigh any moral concern for the early 
fetus. Suppose that this is why Adele favors a pro-choice policy X. 
 By contrast, Betty holds the moral view Q, according to which the 
embryo and early fetus enjoy full moral standing; intentionally terminating the 
existence of a human embryo is thus morally on a par with intentionally killing 
an innocent adult. According to Betty, this moral factor ultimately outweighs 
concern for women's autonomy, as well as concern for the negative social 
consequences of more restrictive access to abortion, and Betty’s commitment to 
these views prompts her to support a pro-life policy Y. 
                                             
22  It is, of course, not essential that the case concerns abortion. If one 
has objections to that particular issue, another case can be easily substituted. 
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 As should be clear from the case, Adele and Betty have a number of 
shared moral views. They both believe that the autonomy of women is a 
weighty moral concern, even if they disagree about whether this concern is 
outweighed by concern for a fetus or not. They are also in agreement that the 
societal and health-related consequences of any legislation on access to 
abortion matter, though they disagree as to which moral concerns might 
supersede such factors. Assume that Adele and Betty also acknowledge and 
agree that values such as respect, accommodation, inclusion and reciprocity 
should both ground and guide their treatment of others. Call these shared 
moral concerns C. 
 So, put very schematically, the case has the following structure. On 
the one hand, Adele believes that taken together, C and P strongly support pro-
choice policy X. Betty, on the other hand, believes that on balance, C and Q 
strongly support pro-life policy Z.  
 Suppose that prior to engaging in their discussion, Adele and Betty 
were highly confident in their respective moral views P and Q, but upon learning 
that they are in disagreement, each is rationally compelled to reduce confidence 
in her moral belief. Assume that Adele and Betty still have most rational 
confidence in their pre-deliberation moral views, even if their confidence has 
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decreased somewhat as a result of reflecting on the disagreement. As noted in 
the previous section, merely reducing rational confidence in one's moral view 
does not seem to generate a reason for compromising. While this is true, I 
suggest that Adele and Betty should nonetheless attach less weight to their 
moral commitments P and Q, now that they have less rational confidence in 
them. To see why, consider the following:  
 
The Reduced Weight Principle. When A assigns lesser credence to the truth of a 
moral commitment, then A should assign lesser weight to the moral factors 
identified by that commitment.23  
                                             
23  As stated, the Reduced Weight Principle presupposes that a familiar 
form of externalism about moral reasons is false. According to this form of 
externalism, whatever moral reasons or factors exist, they exert the same force 
on us, whether we know about them or not. If we grant the truth of this or 
similar forms of externalism, the reduced weight principle would have to be 
restated in terms of subjective moral obligation, or subjective rightness, where 
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According to the Reduced Weight Principle, Adele should assign lesser weight 
to her moral commitment P, and Betty should similarly give lesser weight to her 
commitment Q, as a result of their lowered rational confidence in these 
commitments. 
 As far as I am aware, there are no discussions of principles like the 
Reduced Weight Principle, so one might wonder if it is plausible at all. Some 
reflection suggests that it is. If one is fully confident in the truth of a moral 
commitment, then surely one should assign full weight to the moral factors it 
identifies; not doing so would seem irrational. If one is fully confident that a 
commitment is false, one should, of course, assign the factors identified by that 
commitment no weight at all. But suppose that one assigns some credence in 
between these two extremes to some moral commitment. What should one do? 
It would be odd to assign the moral factors identified no weight at all, but it 
would also be peculiar to assign them full weight, as if one believed the 
                                                                                                                                    
subjective obligation or rightness is a function of what subjects reasonably 
believe about objective rightness.  
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commitment fully. So, the only option seems to be to accept some reduction in 
the weight apportioned to the moral factors identified by a particular moral 
principle, in response to reduced confidence in the truth of that principle. When 
one is less confident in the validity of a purported moral reason or factor, then 
that reason or factor should have less traction in one's moral thinking. This is 
what the Reduced Weight Principle says, and I suggest that this is plausible. 
 If The Reduced Weight Principle is correct, disagreement may in 
some cases engender significant reasons for compromises, or for 
compromising, regarding what is all things considered best. When our moral 
commitments are challenged by disagreement, this should sometimes make us 
less confident in their truth. When this happens, the moral factors identified by 
these commitments should assume less weight in the total array of pro tanto 
reasons, even if we still, on balance, have more confidence that our moral 
commitments are correct than not. This will give more relative weight to 
undisputed moral commitments, including the sort of moral reasons for 
compromising that we discussed earlier. In some cases, this can affect the 
balance of reasons, and ultimately change what we have all things considered 
most reason to do, or what is all things considered best. If we do share moral 
commitments of certain types, disagreement about other commitments may 
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affect our reasons for compromise or reasons for compromising, and this may 
affect what we have all things considered most reasons to. In this sense, moral 
disagreement may give rise to or enable principled compromises. 
8. But are these genuine compromises? 
If what I have argued above is correct, we should often reduce confidence in our 
moral commitments in response to moral disagreement. Pro tanto reasons for 
compromising and pro tanto reasons for compromise can be part of the 
balance of pro tanto reasons that make some option Y all things considered 
best, where Y differs from initially preferred policy options X and Z.24 If the 
Reduced Weight Principle is correct, the implication is that pro tanto reasons to 
compromise and pro tanto reasons for particular compromises will sometimes 
                                             
24  Note that the view does not imply that there are sufficient reasons 
for a compromise position in every disagreement that we encounter. Moreover, 
this does not say that we rationally converge on a compromise position, even if 
our ultimate positions are partly shaped by pro tanto reasons for compromising, 
or for compromise positions. Being moved towards a compromise and 
converging on a compromise are importantly distinct. 
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assume greater relative weight in the total array of reasons when we have moral 
disagreements about all things considered best polices. This will affect what we 
should think is all things considered best, pressing us away from extremes and 
toward what may be described as compromise positions.  
 We can express this in terms of a distinction between pre-
disagreement views and post-disagreement views regarding all things 
considered best policy-options. Adele's pre-disagreement view is Adele's view 
prior to any warranted reduction of rational credence in moral commitments 
due to moral disagreement with Betty. Adele's post-disagreement view is the 
view she holds when her credences has been adjusted in response to moral 
disagreement. Note that we should not be confined to a temporal interpretation 
of the distinction temporally: it might be that only the post-disagreement 
situation actually exists, and that the pre-disagreement is merely a hypothetical 
comparison.25 
 I will now consider a number of objections to the proposed account 
of principled compromises. While there are several distinct objections to 
                                             
25  Thanks to a reviewer promting this clarification. 
How moral disagreement may ground principled moral compromise 
46 
 
address, they all concern whether what the view describes is most aptly 
described as a compromise. 
 First, as May and many others have pointed out, compromising and 
correcting one's view seems distinct, and one may require that an account of 
principled compromises respect this distinction. In some sense, compromising is 
different from changing one's view. 
 On the present account principled compromises about all things 
considered best policies trivially involves a change of belief. Adele's pre-
disagreement view is that X is the best policy option, whereas her post-
disagreement view is that Y is best, so surely Adele has changed her view. 
Alternatively, we might say that Adele's pre-disagreement view is the view that 
Adele would hold, if she did not have her disagreement with Betty to take into 
account. In this case, Adele adopting her post-disagreement is not aptly 
characterized as a change of view. Yet, both scenarios might lead one to 
question whether we should speak of compromise. In the first case because it is 
a change of view, in the second case because Adele simply arrives at what she 
considers all things considered best. 
 I find it implausible that this should prevent us from talking about 
compromises in such cases. Agents should always prefer what they think is all 
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things considered best. So, any view of compromising regarding all things 
considered best policies will include an account of changing one's mind about 
what is all things considered best, or an account of how one arrives at a view 
about what is all things considered best in response to principled reasons for 
compromise. It would be odd to deny the possibility of compromises regarding 
all things considered best policies, because anything that meets this description 
would either be a change of view regarding what is all things considered best, 
or arriving at a view about what is all things considered best. 
 Alternatively, and more plausibly, one might suggest that a 
compromise regarding all things considered best positions require that the 
underlying moral commitments remain unchanged - otherwise it is a correction. 
The proposed account of principled compromises goes some way to meet this 
requirement. First, the account preserves a sense in which one can compromise 
without abandoning one's underlying moral commitments. Undertaking a moral 
commitment by affirming a moral proposition, but becoming less confident 
about it, may still involve affirming it, and is distinct from flat out rejecting it. 
Second, the change in credence driving the compromise are assumed to occur 
in response to the significance of disagreement that one has with fellow citizens. 
They are not assumed to arise in response to first order moral arguments 
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implying that one's moral commitments are false, or to a discovery that one as 
overlooked first order reasons, or made a reasoning mistake. So, even if there is 
a change in view, it is not an ordinary correction of a mistake. 
 This makes some sense of the idea that even if one settles for a 
compromise one would still prefer to convince one's opponent about one's pre-
disagreement view. Suppose that Adele as a result of disagreement with Betty 
now is less confident about the truth of a decisive moral assumption P, but still 
think that there are good reasons for it - it is just that she cannot convince Betty 
about P. Clearly, Adele might still think that she should convince Betty about the 
truth of P, and Adele can rationally think that were she to convince Betty about 
this, then this would entitle her to regain full confidence in P. Similarly, it is often 
suggested that compromises are by nature painful; a compromise essentially 
requires acquiescing to a policy that one continues to find morally inferior. 
Again, the account preserves this feature, at least partially. When she 
compromises, Adele may still consider moral principle P to be correct, though 
she less rationally confident in P and accordingly assigns lesser relative weight 
to the moral factors identified by P. But in so far as Adele still commits to P, 
there is a sense in which she can regret adopting Y, while still thinking that Y is 
all things considered best.  
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 As I said, the account goes some way in preserving a sharp 
difference between compromises and corrections. Clearly, however, the account 
cannot go all the way. If a reduction in credence in a moral proposition is large 
enough, then it amounts to a rejection of the proposition. Note also that I 
assumed in the above that preserving the same propositional content, while 
changing one's credence, is not a change of view, and thus not a correction. But 
of course, on an equally natural reading of 'change of view', it is just that.  
 I submit, however, that a requirement that principled moral 
compromise should involve a change in belief about what is best all things 
considered, but no change in underlying moral commitments, cannot be met. 
To see this, suppose for a moment that a principled compromise requires the 
following: (i) that one's moral commitments (the pro tanto reasons that one 
recognizes) remains unaltered, (ii) that one undergoes a change in view 
regarding what policy is best all things considered, and (iii) that this change in 
view is motivated by a recognition of moral reasons to compromise. These 
requirements are not mutually satisfiable. If condition (iii) is met, then condition 
(i) is violated; if condition (iii) is not met, then condition (i) might be, but in that 
case one's view about what is all things considered best can hardly count as a 
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principled compromise, as it will have to be motivated by reasons that one does 
not recognize as residing in moral commitments. 
 Rather than concluding that principled moral compromises are 
impossible, I suggest that we reject condition (i). This means that we 
acknowledge that principled compromises regarding the all things considere 
best arises in response to an altered set of pro tanto reasons, and in this sense 
they involve a change of mind not only about what is all things considered best, 
but also regarding the nature and balance of pro tanto reasons. If we instead 
were to conclude that genuine compromises regarding all things considered 
best polices are not possible, we should also admit that the notion of principled 
compromise is of less interest. No matter what we opt for, the overarching 
question remains in place, and this is the question what we should do when we 
disagree about moral questions and how this should affect the policies that we 
consider all things considered best. Whether the outcomes of such processes 
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conform to our pre-theoretical views about what counts as a compromise may 
ultimately not be so important. 26 
 Second, it may be thought that compromises should involve an 
element of negotiation or reciprocity: when you and I compromise, I accept 
what I consider to be an inferior option, but in return, you agree to make similar 
concessions on your part. Clearly, this element of bargaining and making 
reciprocal concessions is lacking in the account of compromise given here. 
According to the present account, I should adjust my confidence in my moral 
commitments in response to my disagreement with you, and this should make 
me reconsider what is the all things considered best policy option, but I need 
not negotiate this question with you, and the extent to which I should reduce 
my confidence in a contested moral commitment is ultimately independent of 
any political deal we might strike. Some might think that it is a weakness of the 
account of compromise on offer that this element of bargaining is missing. If 
anything, I believe this to be an advantage of the account in as much as it helps 
                                             
26  Thanks to a reviewer for prompting me to think more clearly about 
the differences between corrections and compromises. 
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to preserve a distinction between negotiating a political deal and having a 
principled reason for compromise. Bargaining should be distinct from the act of 
compromising, and the present account preserves this. 
 A third worry might be the following. Suppose that Adele and Betty 
share a common moral commitment that has nothing to do with reasons that 
are grounded in values like inclusion, accommodation, respect or reciprocity. To 
illustrate with another example, suppose that Adele thinks that liberty and 
efficiency are of utmost importance, while equality is not, whereas Betty thinks 
that concerns about equality and efficiency should have great weight, whereas 
liberty should not. Since Adele and Betty primarily disagree about liberty and 
equality, we can imagine that the policy position each end up they end up 
endorsing is, to a significant extent, determined by their shared concern for 
efficiency. Basically, they bracket the moral concerns that divide them, and 
devise policies based on what they have in common. The question now is why 
we should think of this as a compromise between Adele and Betty? In reply to 
this, it might be pointed out that relative to their respective moral 
commitments, both Adele and Betty must view their resulting positions as 
inferior to the policy options they would have preferred independently of their 
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disagreement. It is this that makes it appropriate to refer to the resulting 
position as a compromise. 
 A final concern may be that positions adopted as compromises in 
the way I have described need not look like compromises at all. Above we 
assumed that compromises involve policy options that can be ordered on a 
scale connecting two extremes. Call this a scalar compromise. Like the issue of 
taxation, many policy disagreements permit scalar compromises. Other cases 
that come to mind are speed limits, age limits on alcohol, and the minimum 
wage. Even the question of abortion could permit of scalar compromises. A 
compromise position on abortion could concern the stage in pregnancy at 
which the abortion can be legally performed, and again, this could be 
represented on a temporal scale.27 However, scalar compromises may be only 
one among several different types of compromise. Consider the public 
controversy over the use of genetically modified crops. Roughly, some are in 
                                             
27  Like all other examples I discuss in this paper, these cases are 
intended to illustrate formal features of compromises, not realistic policy 
options. 
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favor of very restrictive legislation, or of a ban on the use of genetically 
modified crops, making it quite costly or impossible to market such products. 
Others disagree; seeing no particular problem with the use of genetically 
modified crops, some think that these products should be subject to no more or 
less regulation than ordinary crops. There is a well-known, intermediary position 
that simply recommends mandatory labeling of food products containing 
genetically modified crops.28 This is an instance of what one might label a liberal 
compromise. It is easy to see that there may exist liberal compromises in a 
range of morally laden political controversies – think of same sex marriages, 
physician-assisted death, or vegetarianism.29 A liberal compromise is not 
usefully described as a policy option that is somehow located on a spectrum 
between two policy extremes. But liberal compromise may nonetheless be 
attractive in virtue of their ability to accommodate a range of diverse moral 
                                             
28  See also (Weinstock 2013) on other distinctions among types of 
compromise.  
29  For a discussion of compromise on assisted death see (Huxtable 
2014) and the references therein. 
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views. Indeed, when a liberal compromise is found, it may offer a solution to 
some moral conflict that is superior to any other potential compromise position. 
Even if one is disinclined to think of liberal compromises as genuine 
compromises, one must concede that they share a number of important 
features of a compromise. A liberal compromise arises in response to 
disagreement, and it can be motivated in part by a perceived reason to 
accommodate sincerely held views of fellow citizens. Moreover, a liberal 
compromise can be painful in that it can be considered inferior relative to the 
compromisers' basic moral commitments. 
 No doubt some will still consider the category of compromises that 
emerges from this account as too broad to really warrant the label. I am not 
convinced that 'compromise' has such a precise and stable pre-theoretical 
meaning so as to warrant this form of linguistic legislation. Ultimately, the issue 
may turn on what stipulation of the word we decide to work with in philosophy, 
and I am inclined to think that we should set these questions aside as largely 
terminological. The question of overall importance is how recalcitrant 
disagreement about moral issues should feature in what policy we end up 
thinking is the all things considered best. This is a significant question in its own 
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right, and whether the resulting positions should be regarded as compromises 
is of secondary importance. 
9. Concluding remarks 
My aim in this paper has been to develop an account of how moral 
disagreement can ground principled reasons for compromise. May argues that 
disagreement never provides principled moral reasons for compromise. I have 
maintained that his argument overlooks how the balance of pro tanto reasons 
may be affected by changes in levels of rational confidence in disputed moral 
commitments. Moral disagreement should sometimes lead us to reduce 
confidence in our underlying moral commitments. Assuming the truth of the 
Reduced Weight Principle, this yields greater relative weight to pro tanto 
reasons for compromising, or pro tanto reasons for particular compromise 
positions, and this may be part of what determines the all things considered 
best position. Moral disagreement thus facilitates principled moral compromises 
by reducing the impact of the moral views that set us apart, thereby increasing 
the relative import of what binds us together.  
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